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Federal-State Water Relations in
California: From Conflict to
Cooperation
Roderick E. Walston*
INTRODUCTION
In California v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court
held that state water laws generally apply to federal reclamation
projects. The decision has been widely perceived as establishing a
new federal-state relationship concerning the control of water allo-
cation and use. In fact, the decision reaffirmed the original relation-
ship that Congress had in mind in enacting the basic reclamation
law in 1902.2 The California decision has spawned a line of recent
case authority holding that California water laws apply to the federal
Central Valley Project (CVP), the largest federal reclamation project
in the nation. This article will describe the California decision and
the recent case authority applying it to the CVP.
The California decision, beyond generating case authority relating
to the CVP, has ushered in a new era of cooperation in federal-state
water relations in California. Prior to the decision, federal-state water
relations in California were marked by conflict and controversy,
* The author is a California Deputy Attorney General, and a graduate of Columbia
University (B.A.) and Stanford Law School (LL.B.). He represented the State of California
in California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), which is discussed in this article. The
views presented in this article belong to the author and should not be attributed to the State
of California or its agencies.
1. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
2. See generally WaIston, Reborn Federalism in Western Water Law: The New Melones
Dam Decision, 30 HAsmn~as L.J. 1645 (1979).
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particularly over the application of California water laws and policies
to the CVP. The California decision has put this controversy to rest,
thus allowing federal and state agencies to concentrate on providing
for more efficient water uses. To that end, these agencies have
worked out a historic agreement that provides for coordinated op-
eration of the federal and state water projects in California. This
agreement, beyond increasing efficient water uses, signals a new era
of relative tranquillity in federal-state water relations in California.
This article, beyond describing the California decision and its prog-
eny, will also describe the historic operating agreement that signals
the new era.
I. STATE CONTROL OF FEDERAL WATER USES: California v. United
States
In California v. United States,3 the United States Supreme Court
held that the federal government, in operating its reclamation pro-
jects, must comply with state laws relating to appropriation and
distribution of water, except where state laws are inconsistent with
"specific congressional directives. ' 4 This result, the Court stated, is
mandated by section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902,- which
provides that the Secretary of the Interior, in operating the federal
projects, must "proceed in conformity with" state laws relating to
the "control, appropriation, use, or distribution" of water. To fully
understand the significance of section 8 and the Supreme Court
decision interpreting it, one must first understand the historical
relationship of federal and state control of water allocation and use,
and indeed the historical development of western water law.
A. The Appropriation and Riparian Doctrines
The riparian doctrine is the basic water law of the American states
lying east of the Mississippi River. This doctrine, which originated
in the English common law, holds that a landowner has the right to
use water flowing contiguously to his land. 6 Thus, under the riparian
3. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
4. Id. at 672-73.
5. 32 Stat. 390 (1902) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372-383 (1982)).
6. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 391 (1886); Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co.,
200 Cal. 81, 95 (1926); 1 S. Wma, WATER RiGa'rs un TEVE EsTI.R STATES § 709, at 773-75
(3d ed. 1911).
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doctrine, a water right is an incident of land ownership and is not
created by use or lost by nonuse.
The riparian doctrine was il-suited to the needs of the West. The
early settlers often needed to divert water to lands for economic
purposes, but could not assert a riparian right for this purpose. The
early gold miners, for example, needed to divert water to their mining
claims, which were located on public lands owned by the federal
government; since the gold miners did not own the lands, they could
not assert a riparian right. Similarly, the early farmers often needed
to divert water to lands that were not contiguous to a waterway;
since the lands were not contiguous, a riparian right could not be
asserted for this purpose either. The early miners and farmers,
ignoring riparianism, developed a simple custom that recognized the
right of a person to divert water to "beneficial use." Under this
custom, it was irrelevant whether the diverter was a landowner, or
whether the lands were contiguous to the waterway. This custom
ripened into the formal doctrine of appropriation, which is the basic
water law of the West today. Under this doctrine, a water user has
the right to "appropriate," or divert, water to a beneficial use, and
the right continues to exist as long as the use continues to be
beneficial; the priority among competing appropriators is governed
by the principle, "first in time, first in right."' 7 Thus, under the
appropriation doctrine, unlike the riparian doctrine, a water right
depends on actual use and need, not on land ownership.
B. Congress' Land Laws: The Severance Doctrine
Since the federal government was the original owner of the public
domain lands in the West, it seemed doubtful that those who settled
on such lands without a federal patent, such as the early gold miners,
had valid claims. Indeed, the miners were commonly viewed as
trespassers on the public domain. To protect the rights of the miners
7. Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 26 Cal. 3d 183, 195 (1980);
National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 441 (1983); United States v.
Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 742-49 (1950); Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 458-59
(1878). Although most western states have adopted the appropriation doctrine as their exclusive
water rights law, some states, following California's example, have adopted the appropriation
doctrine but retained the riparian doctrine. People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 307 (1980);
R. PowEL, REAL PNoPERTY § 739, at 836 n.54 (1968). Under the California view, California
retained the riparian doctrine when, in 1872, it adopted the English common law-the source
of the riparian doctrine-as its rules of decision. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 225, 380-82 (1886).
In effect, California, and other states following California, have dual systems of water rights.
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and other settlers, or at least to redeem their hopes, Congress enacted
several land laws in the nineteenth century upholding the validity of
their claims, and particularly affirming their water rights. The first
enactment, the Mining Act of 1866, as amended in 1870,8 provided
that the miners' water rights would be protected to the extent that
they were recognized by the "local customs, laws and decisions of
the courts, .... ." The Desert Lands Act of 1877, 9 which required
the issuance of patents to settlers who reclaimed the desert lands,
provided that the settlers' water rights "shall depend on bona fide
prior appropriation," and that "surplus water"-that is, water not
already appropriated by the settlers-would remain "free for the
appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining and man-
ufacturing purposes subject to existing rights."' 0 These enactments,
in effect, provided congressional recognition of the appropriation
doctrine adopted by the western states and territories, although the
full scope and extent of such recognition was unclear.
The United States Supreme Court clarified the meaning of Con-
gress' land laws in its landmark decision in California Oregon Power
Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.," rendered in 1935. There, the
Court held that the Desert Lands Act of 1877, if not the Mining
Acts of 1866 and 1877, effected a "severance" of all waters on the
public domain lands from the lands themselves.12 As a result of the
severance, each state has the right to adopt either the appropriation
doctrine or the riparian doctrine; "Congress cannot enforce either
rule upon any state." 3 Therefore, water rights on the public domain
are controlled by the state, although the lands themselves remain
subject to federal disposition and control. Hence, federal patentees
who acquire lands from the federal government, such as homesteaders
and desert-land entrymen, must acquire their water rights from the
states, and their priority to the use of water depends on state law.
In effect, Congress' land policy, as interpreted in California Oregon
Power, allowed the states to adopt their own water rights policy,
rather than establish a national policy.
The western states have adopted administrative or judicial systems
to carry out their water rights laws. In California, for example, the
8. 14 Stat. 253 (1866) (amended by 16 Stat. 218 (1870)) (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 661 (1982)).
9. 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-323 (1982)).
10. Id.
11. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
12. Id. at 158.
13. Id. at 164 (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907)).
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Legislature has adopted a comprehensive scheme governing appro-
priative water rights. 4 Under this scheme, the State Water Resources
Control Board (State Board) has "exclusive jurisdiction" to admin-
ister the appropriative rights system. 5 In exercising this authority,
the State Board may issue an appropriative permit or license, subject
to appropriate terms and conditions, if it determines that the pro-
posed use is "reasonable and beneficial" and in the "public inter-
est.' '16 The State Board's decisions are subject to judicial review.17
C. The Reclamation Act of 1902: Section 8
In the spirit of progressivism and nationalism prevailing at the
turn of the century, Congress enacted the Reclamation Act of 1902
(the Act), 8 which was designed to promote the West's economy by
developing its sparse water supply. Under this Act, the federal
government, acting by the Secretary of the Interior, is authorized to
construct and operate reclamation projects in the western region. To
prevent monopolies from acquiring the water developed by the pro-
jects, section 5 of the Act imposes an acreage limit on the amount
of land held under single ownership that can receive water from the
projects; the original limit was 160 acres, although the limit was
recently increased. 19 To ensure that the states would have the right
to control distribution and use of the water, section 8 provides that
the Act "shall [not] be construed as affecting or intended to affect
or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory
relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water
used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder," and
further that the Secretary of the Interior, "in carrying out the
provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with [State and
14. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1000-2900 (West 1971 & Supp. 1988); Environmental Defense
Fund v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 26 Cal. 3d 183, 195 (1980); National Audubon Soc'y v.
Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 441 (1983); People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 306, 309(1980).
15. CAL. WATER CODE § 179 (West 1971).
16. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; CAL. WATER CODE §§ 100, 1201, 1240, 1243, 1243.5, 1255,
1257 (Vest 1971 & Supp. 1988)); Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 138
(1967); Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 367 (1935); Chow v. City of Santa Barbara,
217 Cal. 673, 698 (1933).
17. CAL. vATER CODE § 1360 (West 1971).
18. 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-383 (1982)).
19. 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1982). In 1982, Congress increased the acreage limitation from 160
acres to 960 acres. See Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 1263, 1265 (1982) (codified
as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 390dd (1982)).
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Territorial] laws. .. ."20 The legislative debates indicate that section
8 was intended to follow the pattern of the Mining Law Act of 1866
and 1870 and the Desert Lands Act of 1877, which, as noted earlier,
establish the severance between land and water as articulated by the
Supreme Court in California Oregon Power; these enactments were
cited by the House floor leader as the model for section 8.21 Indeed,
several congressmen argued that section 8 reaffirmed the constitu-
tional principle that the states acquire sovereign ownership and
control of navigable waters upon admission to statehood, suggesting
that state law would apply to project water whether Congress enacted
section 8 or not.2-
D. Judicial Construction of Section 8
In several early decisions, the Supreme Court stated that section 8
provides for federal deference to state water laws. In Kansas v.
Colorado,3 decided in 1907, the Court stated that the federal gov-
ernment lacks constitutional power to "override state laws in respect
to the general subject of reclamation," adding that, in light of section
8, "Congress has [not] acted in disregard to this limitation."' 4 In
another case involving a dispute between Nebraska and Wyoming
over the North Platte River, the Court stated that the Secretary of
the Interior, in acquiring water rights for federal reclamation projects,
"must obtain permits and priorities for the use of water in the same
manner as a private appropriator or an irrigation district formed
under the state law."' 5 In these cases, however, the Court was not
called on to construe the provision in a direct conflict between the
federal government and a state over federal reclanmation water uses.
A direct conflict finally arose in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v.
McCracken,'26 decided in 1958. In that case, several large water
20. 32 Stat. 390 (1902) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 (1982)).
21. 35 CoNG. REc. 6679 (1902) (remarks of Rep. Mondell) ("Every act since that of April
26, 1866, has recognized local laws and customs appertaining to the appropriation and
distribution of water used in irrigation, and it has been deemed wise to continue our'policy
in that regard.").
22. Id. at 6770 (remarks of Rep. Sutherland). Representative Sutherland was subsequently
appointed as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and was the author of the Supreme
Court's decision in California Oregon Power holding that the congressional land laws effected
a "severance" of water from the public domain lands. 295 U.S. 142, 158 (1935).
23. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
24. Id. at 92.
25. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 295 U.S. 40, 42-43 (1935). See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589, 629 (1945).
26. 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
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districts in California argued that, since section 8 requires deference
to state law and since California law contains no provision limiting
water deliveries to lands not exceeding 160 acres, the icreage limi-
tation does not apply in California. The Supreme Court rejected the
argument, stating that the acreage provision is a "specific and
mandatory" requirement of the reclamation laws and that therefore
Congress did not intend for section 8 "to overiide the repeatedly
reaffirmed national policy" contained in the acreage limitation.2 7 The
Court went beyond the immediate dispute by stating, in dictum; that
section 8 "merely requires the United States to comply with state
law when ... it becomes necessary for it to acquire water rights or
vested interests" for reclamation purposes; that "the acquisition of
water rights must not be confused with the operation of federal
projects;" and that "nothing in § 8 ... compels the United States
to deliver water on conditions imposed by the States." In effect,
the Court seemed to suggest that federal agencies must acquire their
water rights under state law but -that the states cannot impose any
conditions on such water rights, and in particular cannot determine
how or for what purpose such water will be used.
The Supreme Court applied the Ivanhoe analysis in two subsequent
decisions rendered in 1963, City of Fresno v. California2 and Arizona
v. California.3 0 In City of Fresno, the Court, citing Ivanhoe, ruled
that California laws establishing preferential rights for counties and
watersheds of origin, and establishing priorities for domestic uses
over irrigation uses, do not apply to water delivered by federal
agencies under the Reclamation Act of 1902.31 In Arizona, the Court,
again citing Ivanhoe, held that the Secretary of the Interior need not
comply with state law in distributing Colorado River water in the
states of Arizona and California.32 In the latter case, the Court ruled
that the Secretary's power to sign contracts with water users overrides
the states' general power to control water allocation and use. 33
27. Id. at 291-92.
28. Id.
29. 372 U.S. 627 (1963).
30. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
31. City of Fresno, 372 U.S. at 630.
32. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 585-88. In fact, the Court interpreted and applied sections 14
and 18 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§
617-617t (1982)), which governs the federal reclamation project on the Colorado River. Sections
14 and 18 contain language similar to that found in section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902.
See Arizona, 373 U.S. at 585-88.
33. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 586.
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E. The California Decision
In California v. United States,34 the Supreme Court squarely held
that section 8 requires federal compliance with state water laws-
including state laws relating both to appropriation and distribution
of water-and overturned its earlier dictum in Ivanhoe and City of
Fresno suggesting otherwise. 35 In California, the United States Bureau
of Reclamation (USBR), which operates the federal projects, applied
to the State Board for permits to appropriate water for the New
Melones Project on California's Stanislaus River. The State Board
granted the permits, subject to several conditions restricting both
appropriation and distribution of water; the major conditions pro-
hibited the USBR from storing water for the project until it had
developed a plan for. consumptive water uses that met with the State
Board's approval.36 The United States brought an action against the
State Board to overturn the conditions, arguing that under Ivanhoe
and its progeny the Board lacked power to impose conditions on the
federal right to store and use water. The United States' argument
was upheld by the district court and by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals .37
The Supreme Court, after granting certiorari, reversed the lower
ruling in a decision authored by then Associate Justice Rehnquist.38
Tracing the history of federal and state water relations, the Court
observed that "through it runs the consistent thread of purposeful
and continued deference to the state water law by Congress. '39 The
Court concluded that Congress meant to follow the same policy in
34. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
35. The Court specifically "disavow[ed]" the "dictum" in Ivanhoe and City of Fresno
stating that state law does not generally apply to federal reclamation projects. California, 438
U.S. at 673, 674. The Court distinguished the Arizona case on grounds that, because of "the
unique size and multistate scope of the Project, Congress did not intend the States to interfere
with the Secretary's power to determine with whom and on what terms water contracts would
be made." Id. at 674. In light of the reasoning of the California decision and the absence of
any unique federal interest relating to distribution of water from the Boulder Canyon Project,
it is possible that the Court may reconsider its decision in Arizona interpreting the states'
rights provisions of the authorizing act, assuming that an appropriate controversy is presented
to the Court.
36. United States v. California, 694 F.2d 1171, 1173, 1182-85 (9th Cir. 1982).
37. United States v. California, 403 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd with modifl.
cations, 558 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom, California v. United States, 438 U.S.
645 (1978).
38. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
39. Id. at 653.
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enacting section 8. Under this provision, the Court reasoned, state
law applies to federal water appropriations in two ways: "First, ...
the Secretary would have to appropriate, purchase, or condemn
necessary water rights in strict conformity with state law .... Second,
once the waters were released from the dam, their distribution to
individual landowners would again be controlled by state law." 4 The
Court also stated, however, that state law cannot be applied if it is
contrary to "congressional directives," such as the directive that
project water not be available to lands exceeding 160 acres under
single ownership. 41 Thus, although the Court overturned Ivanhoe's
dictum that state water laws are not generally applicable to federal
water appropriations, it preserved Ivanhoe's holding that state law
cannot override the acreage limitation contained in the federal rec-
lamation laws. The Court appeared to follow the general rule of
statutory construction that, in a conflict between two statutory pro-
visions, the more specific provision controls.42 The Court remanded
the case to the lower courts for determination of whether the con-
ditions imposed by the State Board on the New Melones Project
were inconsistent with "congressional directives. '43
II. EFFECT OF THE CALIFORNIA DECISION UPON THE FEDERAL
CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT IN CALIFORNIA
The main effect of the California decision has been upon the
federal Central Valley Project (CVP) in California, one unit of
which-the New Melones Project-was the focus of the California
decision itself. The CVP was originally conceived as a State project
during the Great Depression of the 1930s, but was taken over by the
federal government after California was unable to sell the bonds
necessary to finance the project. 44 The CVP, authorized by Congress
in 1935 and reauthorized in 1937, 45 stores water from remote moun-
tainous regions for agricultural and domestic use elsewhere in Cali-
fornia. The project diverts water from the Sacramento-San Joaquin
40. Id. at 665, 667.
41. Id. at 672-73.
42. E.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973); Enzor v. United States, 262
F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1958).
43. California, 438 U.S. at 679.
44. E. COOPER, AQUEDUCT EMPIRE 149 (Arthur H. Clark Co., Glendale, Cal. (1968)).
45. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 1028, 1038; Rivers and Harbors Act of
1937, 50 Stat. 844, 850.
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Delta through a federal aqueduct to customers in central and southern
California. The project is operated by the USBR, a branch of the
United States Department of the Interior, although many units of
the project have been built by the Army Corps of Engineers.
The CVP, as originally authorized, consisted primarily of the
Shasta Dam and Reservoir, located on the upper Sacramento River.
As California's population has increased and its economy grown,
Congress has authorized additional units of the CVP to accommodate
California's growing water needs. The additional units include, among
others, the Friant Dam, the Folsom Dam, the Pine Flat Dam, and
others. The New Melones Dam, which was the focus of the California
decision, was authorized in 1944 and 1962 as part of the CVP.46 As
of 1978, the USBR held State water rights permits authorizing
appropriation of 6.1 million acre feet of water annually for the CVP,
and had received assignments from State agencies of permits author-
izing appropriation of an additional 9.2 million acre feet annually. 47
The CVP is the largest source of California's developed water supply
and thus has a major impact on California's economy.
Several recent court decisions have applied the California decision
in specific controversies affecting the CVP, and held that the decision
requires the USBR to comply with State water laws in operating the
project. These recent court decisions form an increasingly broad
matrix that affects the operation of the CVP, and will now be
described more fully.
A. Remand of California v. United States
The California decision was first applied in the remanded proceed-
ing of the California case itself. In the remanded proceeding, the
Ninth Circuit upheld all conditions imposed by the State Board on
USBR appropriations for the New Melones Project.48 The main
condition deferred water storage for the project until the USBR had
developed a specific plan for consumptive water uses-particularly
for irrigation-that met with the State Board's approval. The United
States argued that the condition was invalid because Congress had
46. Flood Control Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 887; Flood Control Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 1180,
1191.
47. Memorandum, Water Supply and Water Rights Data, Governor's Commission to
Review California's Water Rights Law, at 3, 6 (August 4, 1977).
48. United States v. California, 694 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1982).
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intended for the USBR to decide when project water should be
stored. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that Con-
gress had not mandated storage prior to development of a plan for
consumptive uses.49 The court reasoned that, until such a plan was
developed, the USBR was unable to demonstrate that it would put
the water to beneficial use; under California law, water cannot be
appropriated unless it is shown that the water will be put to beneficial
use.50 The court ruled that Congress had not intended to override
state appropriation laws relating to the beneficial use requirement,
and therefore that the USBR cannot store water until it satisfies this
requirement.5 1
The United States argued, alternatively, that if it could not store
water for consumptive uses-such as irrigation-until specific needs
arose, it could store water for hydropower purposes because it had
an immediate need for such storage. That is, although the USBR
had not yet signed contracts with farmers for delivery of irrigation
water, it had signed contracts with power companies for delivery of
power generated by the project. The district court had upheld the
United States' argument, thus authorizing immediate storage of water
for power purposes.52 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court
ruling. According to the Ninth Circuit, power was an "incidental"
rather than primary purpose of the project, and thus water could
not be stored for secondary power purposes where it could not be
stored for the main purpose of irrigation.5 3 In effect, the court held
that the USBR could not store water for power until it could store
49. Id. at 1177-79. The State Board conditions also prohibited the USBR from storing
water until it had satisfied the Board that the benefits of the project outweigh its harm. Id.
at 1177. California conceded that this condition was excessive if construed to authorize the
State to permanently prevent full impoundment, since Congress had already weighed the project
benefits and harm in authorizing the project. Id. California argued, however, that the condition
should be construed narrowly to allow the State to defer impoundment until the USBR had
developed a consumptive use plan that met with the Board's approval. Id. The court upheld
the condition as so construed. Id. at 1177-78.
50. Id. at 1177-79.
51. Id. at 1178. The court also noted that the "precepts of federalism" established by
section 8 "should produce mutual respect and accommodation for state interests;" that it was
thus "incumbent on the United States to respond to California's request for a full showing
of the benefits which were to be expected from operation of the dam at full capacity;" and
that the United States had failed to meet this burden because it had "presented in remand
no evidence of impracticality or harmful consequences from any specific condition set by
the California State Board." Id. at 1174, 1178.
52. United States v. California, 509 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 694 F.2d 1171
(9th Cir. 1982).
53. United States v. California, 694 F.2d 1171, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 1982).
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water for irrigation, and that it could not store water for the latter
purpose until specific needs arose.
The Ninth Circuit also upheld two other important conditions
imposed by the State Board on the project, the first requiring the
USBR to provide a preference for water uses for "counties of origin"
and the second requiring the USBR to maintain downstream water
quality needs.5 4 The court held that neither condition was inconsistent
with congressional directives, and indeed that the conditions "lead
to results anticipated, and apparently encouraged, by Congress." 55
The United States had argued that Congress intended for federal
operating agencies to make all decisions concerning the needs of
counties of origin and of water quality, irrespective of whether the
conditions were substantively consistent with Congress' goals. The
Ninth Circuit rejected the argument, stating that the argument would
potentially invalidate virtually all state conditions applied to federal
projects and would conflict with the "federalism concerns" under-
lying section 8 .56 The Ninth Circuit, in effect, measured the validity
of state law in terms of its substantive effect on the federal project,
not in terms of its effect on the USBR's procedural operational
authority.
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit also stated that the state
cannot take over the "actual operation" of federal projects, since
Congress contemplated that federal agencies would operate the pro-
jects; hence, "a state cannot require an action solely because a
federal agency, on its own initiative, could have decided to do it. "' 7
This line of demarcation, however, is unclear. Certainly a state cannot
take over the physical operation of a project, since Congress clearly
directed federal agencies to assume this responsibility. On the other
hand, any state law applied to a federal project will affect its
operation, and thus cannot be said to be invalid simply because it
affects the project "operation." The Ninth Circuit's comment relating
to the USBR's operational authority appears to suggest an indistinct
line between policy choices relating to water allocation and use, on
54. Id. at 1180-81.
55. Id. at 1181.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1181, 1182. The court stated that:
State law, where not inconsistent with federal law, was to control only the impound-
ment of water into the dam and the distribution of water from the dam to individual
landowners. We doubt that California was intended to play a significant role in
influencing the later operation of the dam.
Id. at 1182.
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the one hand, and ministerial authority to physically operate the
project, on the other. If so, the states would have authority to
control water allocation and use within the larger framework of
congressional policy, but would not have authority to otherwise
control the physical operation of the project.58
B. The South Delta Case
In South Delta Water Agency v. United States, 9 the Ninth Circuit
followed and applied the California decision in holding that the
United States had waived sovereign immunity in an action brought
by a private water user. In that case, the South Delta Water Agency
(SDWA) brought an action against the United States, alleging that
the USBR was operating the CVP in disregard of SDWA's prior
water rights under California lawA° The United States moved to
dismiss the action on grounds that it had not waived its sovereign
immunity and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction in the
matter. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 6' Congress has
waived sovereign immunity in non-damages actions against federal
agencies or officers acting under color of federal law.62 The waiver
applies, however, only if there is "law to apply" to such federal
agencies or officers.63 The United States argued that there was no
"law to apply" because state law was not applicable to the United
States. Therefore, the sovereign immunity issue turned on whether
58. The Ninth Circuit also stated in dictum that, "once the federal government has made
binding contracts for delivery of water, California would be more restricted than it was when
it originally regulated impoundment and distribution of water." 694 F.2d at 1182. This
proposition appears more the function of federal constitutional guaranties relating to private
property and contracts than of section 8. That is, the taking clause of the United States
Constitution prohibits the states from taking property without payment of compensation. U.S.
CONST. amends. V, XIV; Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Similarly, the contract clause prohibits the states from impairing private contracts. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cL 1; United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1976). These provisions
may limit state power to impose conditions on USBR water appropriations that affect contracts
between the USBR and its customers. No such limit, however, seems to be found in section
8 itself.
59. 767 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1985).
60. The plaintiff also named the State of California as a defendant, alleging that the
State was operating its own water project in disregard of the plaintiffs prior rights.
61. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (West 1982).
62. Id. § 702.
63. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (citing S. REP.
No. 572, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)); South Delta Water Agency v. United States, 767
F.2d 531, 536.
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state law applies to the CVP under section 8 of the Reclamation Act
of 1902.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the United States' sovereign immunity
argument. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in California v.
United States, the court held that state law applies to the federal
project under section 8.64 The court also noted that the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1937,65 which reauthorized the CVP, specifically
provided that the provisions of "the reclamation law" govern the
project; since section 8 is part of the reclamation law, the section is
made applicable to the CVP under the 1937 reauthorizing Act. 6 The
United States contended, however, that section 2 of the 1937 Act,
which authorizes the United States to acquire water rights for the
CVP by purchase or condemnation, authorizes the United States to
acquire water rights "by seizure or otherwise," even where state law
bars the acquisition. 67 The Ninth Circuit also rejected this argument.
The court reasoned that section 2 of the 1937 Act is patterned after
section 7 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, which also authorizes the
federal government to acquire water rights by purchase or condem-
nation; since the Supreme Court in California v. United States
specifically held that the federal government must comply with state
law in acquiring water rights by purchase or condemnation, 8 neither
section 7 of the 1902 Act nor section 2 of the 1937 Act can be
construed differently. 69 In effect, the court held that the United
States' authority to acquire water rights by purchase or condemna-
tion, whether based on the general reclamation laws or the CVP
authorizing legislation, cannot override the United States' specific
obligation to comply with state law under section 8.
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the United States' argument that
section 11460 of the California Water Code, which establishes a
preference for CVP water for watersheds of origin, does not apply
to the United States. The United States' argument was based on the
Supreme Court's dictum in City of Fresno v. California,70 which
stated that California's watershed protection provisions do not apply
to the United States.71 The Ninth Circuit noted that the dictum was
64. South Delta, 767 F.2d at 536-59.
65. 50 Stat. 844, 850 (1937).
66. South Delta, 767 F.2d at 537.
67. Id.
68. 438 U.S. 645, 665 (1978).
69. South Delta, 767 F.2d at 537.
70. 372 U.S. 627 (1963).
71. Id. at 629-30.
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expressly disavowed in California v. United States.72 The court also
ruled that the United States bears "the burden of proof ... to show
that compliance [with state law] would violate a relevant congressional
directive, ' 73 and held that the United States had failed to sustain its
burden with respect to the watershed preference provision. 74
C. The Delta Decision
In United States v. State Water Resources Control Board,75 the
United States challenged a landmark state water rights decision
requiring the CVP to maintain water quality standards for the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, arguing that the requirement violated
federal law. After Congress authorized the CVP in the 1930s, the
USBR applied to the State Board for permits to appropriate water
for the project and to divert the water from the Delta. The State
Board, although issuing the permits, retained jurisdiction to impose
conditions for the protection of Delta water quality. In 1978, the
State Board issued Decision 1485, requiring the USBR to limit
diversions as necessary to protect public uses and prior water rights
in the Delta. Specifically, the conditions required the USBR to
maintain certain water quality standards at selected Delta locations;
the standards were regarded as necessary to prevent the intrusion of
ocean salt water in the Delta. The United States brought a mandamus
action against the State Board in state court, alleging that the
conditions were inconsistent with congressional directives relating to
the CVP.
The California Court of Appeal rejected the United States' argu-
ment, holding that the conditions were not inconsistent with con-
gressional directives and hence were lawful under section 8.76 The
United States had argued, among other things, that the CVP au-
72. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 673; South Delta, 767. F.2d at 538.
73. South Delta, 767 F.2d at 539.
74. Id. The Ninth Circuit also rejected the United States' argument that the courts lack
jurisdiction to review federal acquisitions of water rights by purchase or condemnation.
According to the United States, the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, and the McCarran
Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666, limit relief in such cases to damages for inverse condemnation,
and do not authorize injunctive relief to prevent the acquisition. The court held, however,
that recent amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act and other federal laws authorize
complainants to seek injunctive relief, thus opening up new avenues of relief that might not
have been otherwise permissible. Id. at 540.
75. 182 Cal. App. 3d 82 (1986).
76. Id. at 134-37.
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thorizing act provided that project water would be stored and used
only for certain specified purposes-including "river regulation"-
and that salinity control was not among the specified purposes. The
Court of Appeal ruled, however, that "river regulation" includes
salinity control, relying on the relevant legislative history and presi-
dential proclamations. 77 The court also held that the federal Clean
Water Act,78 which requires federal agencies to comply with laws
relating to the "control and abatement of pollution,' ' 9 also requires
the USBR to comply with state water quality standards. The court
stated that the Clean Water Act provisions were relevant because, in
the court's view, salinity intrusion is a form of water pollution within
the purview of the federal act. 0 In effect, the court held that state
law applies to the federal project under both the Reclamation Act
of 1902 and the Clean Water Act.
The Court of Appeal's analysis of section 8, although seemingly
correct in its conclusion, improperly focused on whether the State
Board conditions were consistent rather than inconsistent with con-
gressional directives. Under the court's analysis, the conditions were
permissible because they were consistent with specific project purposes
contemplated by Congress. In California v. United States, on the
other hand, the Supreme Court held that state laws were valid unless
they are inconsistent with Congress' goals. Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit in the remanded California case upheld State conditions
deferring water storage even though there was no indication that
Congress had contemplated such deferral of storage, Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit in the South Delta case specifically noted that the
United States has the "burden of proof' to show that state law
"would violate a relevant congressional directive."'" Thus, under the
proper view, state law is valid unless it is shown to be specifically
contrary to a congressional directive, whether or not it is consistent
with a specific congressional goal. Therefore, the California Court
of Appeal should have properly considered only whether Congress
forbade the use of CVP water for salinity control purposes, not
whether Congress contemplated the use of water for such purposes.
Perhaps it is understandable that the court applied the more stringent
77. Id. at 136-87.
78. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (vest 1982).
79. Section 11, 33 U.S.C. § 1323. See Environmental Protection Agency v. California ex
rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
80. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d at 136-37.
81. South Delta Water Agency v. United States, 767 F.2d 531, 539 (9th Cir. 1985).
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standard, since its view that Congress contemplated the state-imposed
condition strengthened its conclusion that the condition applies. Even
so, from a purely analytical point of view, the kind of federalism
contemplated by the Supreme Court in California v. United States
provides a more potent recognition of state interests than the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal's analysis in the Delta case.
D. The Coordinated Operating Agreement
Long after the initial units of the CVP were operational, California
built its own water project to redistribute water from areas of origin
to areas of need. The State Water Project (SWP) was authorized by
the Burns-Porter Act,82 which was enacted by the California Legis-
lature in 1959; this Act authorizes the issuance of $1.75 billion in
general obligation bonds to finance the project. The bond issue was
approved by the California electorate in 1960. The main feature of
the SWP is a massive dam and reservoir located on the upper Feather
River, a tributary of the Sacramento River. The water released from
storage flows downstream to the Sacramento River and eventually to
the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, where the water is commingled
with water released from upstream CVP storage facilities. The SWP
diverts water from the Delta through a state aqueduct to central and
southern California, where the water is used for domestic and agri-
cultural purposes. The SWP is designed to deliver 4.23 million acre
feet of water annually to its customers. 83 This delivery capacity,
however, has not been achieved because the project, as originally
envisioned, has not been completed. Indeed, increasing political op-
position has raised doubts as to whether the project will ever be
completed. The largest contractor for SWP water is the Metropolitan
Water District, which supplies water to local agencies in the southern
California area, including the cities of Los Angeles and San Diego. 84
The SWP and CVP overlap both in their goals and operations.
Both projects store water from northern California rivers for domestic
and agricultural use elsewhere in the State. Both use the Sacramento
River as a conveyance channel, and both divert water from this
channel at the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. The Delta, in essence,
82. CAL. WATMR CODE §§ 12930-12944 (West 1971).
83. D. SECKLER, CALIFORNIA WATER: A SruIY IN REouRCE MANAGBMENT 14 (edited by
D. Seckler, 1971).
84. Id.
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provides a common pool linking the supply and distribution systems
of both projects. Because of the parallel nature of the projects and
their dependency on the same pool, several important policy and
technical questions have arisen concerning operation of the projects,
and the project operators have attempted in recent years to resolve
these operational questions by working out an agreement for coor-
dinated operation of the projects.
Perhaps the major operational question was, originally, whether
the federal project is subject to the same constraints of state law
that apply to the state project. Must the federal project comply with
state laws establishing a preference for counties and watersheds of
origin? Must the federal project comply with Delta water quality
standards imposed by the State Board? If the federal project is not
required to comply with Delta water quality standards, the State
project may be required to allocate a disproportionate share of its
own yield for this purpose, thus impairing the State project's capa-
bility of achieving its own objectives. This operational question was,
of course, resolved by the Supreme Court decision in California v.
United States and its progeny, which make clear that the federal
project must comply with state law except where Congress has
directed otherwise, and in particular that the federal project must
comply with the State Board's Delta water quality standards. Indeed,
the Supreme Court in the California decision commented unfavorably
on the possibility that a federal project may be operated under
different requirements than other projects, stating that section 8 of
the Reclamation Act of 1902 was intended to avoid "the legal
confusion that would arise if federal water law and state water law
reigned side by side in the same locality.85
Another operational question involves the allocation of water be-
tween the projects in times of water shortage. This question, unlike
the first question described above, arises under state law rather than
federal law. That is, assuming that the federal project must comply
with California law, what are the respective obligations of the federal
and state projects under California law to meet Delta water quality
standards in times of water shortage? This question, in a larger sense,
involves the relative priority of the projects' water rights under
California law. If, for example, the CVP has prior' water rights as
against the SWP, the CVP may be able to export any available water
85. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 669 (1978).
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in the Delta to CVP customers in times of drought, thus placing the
burden on the SWP to meet Delta water quality standards before
exporting water to its own customers.
The relative priority of the projects' water rights is a difficult
questioil. Under California's appropriation law, the priority belongs
to the appropriator who commences his diversion first; to be "first
in time" is to be "first in right."'8 6 Sinc~the initial CVP units were
operational before the SWP was built, the CVP would seem to be
"first in time." Other units of the CVP, however, such as the New
Melones Project, were built after the SWP was fully operational.
Further, some CVP and SWP water rights derive from assignments
of water rights from State agencies before either the CVP or SWP
were operational.87 These circumstances make it very difficult to sort
out the relative priority of the projects' water rights. The difficulty
is compounded by the fundamental principle of California water
law-established by constitutional amendment enacted in 1928-that
a water right exists only to the extent that the water is put to
"reasonable and beneficial use." '8 8 This constitutional principle es-
tablishes a rule of reasonableness as California's basic water law. 9
The rule of reasonableness appears to temper priorities based on
strict chronology of use-such as the "first in time, first in right"
rule-particularly as applied to large water projects that serve im-
portant public needs. The reasonableness rule would appear to require
a more qualitative evaluation of the needs of people, industries, and
resources dependent on the projects' water supply, and of alternative
ways in which such needs can be met. For these reasons, the relative
priority of the projects' water rights is a highly complicated question,
one that has never been fully answered.
The operators of the SWP and CVP have attempted for many
years to resolve these operational questions through the medium of
negotiation rather than litigation. In 1960, the project operators
signed an interim agreement that provided for sharing of deficiencies
in times of shortage, and that established a mechanism to resolve
disputes over such shares.9 The agreement recognized the need for
86. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
88. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; Joslin v. Matin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 138
(1967); Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 367 (1935).
89. Joslin v. Main Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 138 (1967).
90. Statement of David N. Kennedy, Director, California Department of Water Resources,
Before the Subcomm. of Water and Power Resources of the House Comm. of Interior and
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a further agreement providing for coordinated operation of the
projects, particularly for protection of Delta water quality. 91 In 1971,
after further negotiations, the project operators signed an agreement
providing for full coordinated operation of the projects, but the
agreement never took effect because it was successfully challenged in
a court action on grounds that adequate environmental documenta-
tion had not been completed.Y2 The project operators, however,
informally operated the projects in a coordinated manner on the
basis of annual letters of agreement that essentially followed the 1971
agreement. 93 Finally, after continued negotiations, the project oper-
ators reached a final agreement in May 1985 for full coordinated
operation of the projects, subject to approval by Congress.94 This
historic agreement is known as the Coordinated Operating Agreement
(COA).
The main provision of the COA provides that the CVP and the
SWP "will be operated in conformity with" current Delta water
quality standards established by the State Board. 95 If the State Board
amends the standards, the CVP shall comply with the new standards
if the United States determines that the standards are "not inconsis-
tent with congressional directives .. ."96 If the United States deter-
mines that the new standards are not consistent with congressional
directives, it shall request the United States Attorney General to bring
an action "for the purpose of determining the applicability of the
new Delta standards" to the CVP.97 These provisions thus require
the CVP to comply with the State Board's existing Delta water
quality standards, and provide that disputes involving future stan-
dards will be resolved by the courts applying the principles of
California v. United States. In effect, these provisions reaffirm the
significant principles of federalism laid down in the California deci-
Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (this statement is included as part of Appendix
A to Draft Environmental Impact Statement/Report: Coordinated Operation Agreement (July
1985) which is on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Agreement Between the United States of America and the State of California For
Coordinated Operation of the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project [hereinafter
COA], art. 11(a). The COA is printed as Appendix A to the Draft Environmental Impact
Statement/Report: Coordinated Operation Agreement (July 1985) (on file at the Pacific Law
Journal).
96. Id.
97. Id. at art. 11(b).
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sion, and make clear that these principles apply to the CVP. Although
the COA provisions do not establish new law beyond that already
laid down by the Supreme Court, the provisions reflect a commitment
by federal officials to comply with California law and thus signify
an era of cooperation with respect to the federal water program in
California. The COA is thus a landmark achievement in the devel-
opment of California water law.
The COA also establishes in specific terms the relative obligations
of the CVP and SWP to meet Delta water quality needs, particularly
in times of shortage. According to the COA, the CVP must release
sufficient water from storage to meet seventy-five percent of the
water needs of the Sacramento River basin-including the Delta-
and the SWP must release sufficient water to meet the remaining
twenty-five percent of such needs.98 In times of shortage, the project
operators shall confer on possible operational changes to minimize
the shortages, and otherwise each project may export water only to
the extent that it has met its above-described obligation to protect
Delta water quality needs.9 Thus, in times of shortage, the projects
are required to proportionately reduce diversions from the Delta in
order to protect Delta needs.
The COA also provides that the SWP, which has substantial
conveyance capacity, shall be allowed to convey, or "wheel," CVP
water from the Delta in exchange for reimbursement of the SWP's
incremental costs for conveying the water.' °° Also, the COA provides
that the project operators may negotiate a contract for sale of surplus
CVP water to the SWP. 10
The USBR took the position that, although it agreed in principle
with the COA, it lacked authority to sign the agreement without
congressional approval. Accordingly, the COA was submitted to
Congress for approval. In October 1986, Congress authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to sign the COA.102 The authorization
amended the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937,103 which had originally
reauthorized the CVP, to provide that the Secretary is "authorized
and directed" to operate the CVP, "in conjunction with the State
98. Id. at art. 6(c). The COA also provides that the federal project shall be allowed to
capture 55% of the excess water flow, and that the SWP shall be allowed to capture the
remaining 45% of the excess flow. Id. at art. 6(d)(1).
99. Id. at art. 9.
100. Id. at art. 10(a)-(c).
101. Id. at art. 10(h).
102. 100 Stat. 3050, 3051 (1986).
103. 50 Stat. 850 (1937).
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of California water project, [and] in conformity with" state water
quality standards for the Delta, unless the Secretary determines that
such standards are "not consistent With the congressional directives
applicable to the project;" in the latter event, the Secretary must
request the United States Attoriey General to initiate a judicial
action "for the purposes of deiermining the applicability of such
standards to the project."' 104 Thus, Congress reaffirmed the principle
established by the Supreme Court in California v. United States, and
made the principle expressly applicable to the CVP. On November
24, 1986, amid considerable fanfare, representatives of the United
States and the State of California signed the COA, thus completing
the final step of this historic negotiation process.
CONCLUSION
The California decision, which held that state water laws generally
apply to federal water projects, has resolved the major controversy
that permeated the federal reclamation program during much of its
history. In the wake of California, several courts have upheld specific
state laws as applied to specific federal projects, particularly in
California. The main impact of the California decision, however,
may be in resolving the major jurisdictional dispute between federal
and state water agencies, thus allowing these agencies to concentrate
on increasing the efficient utilization of the West's sparse water
resources. Indeed, in California itself, federal and state agencies have
agreed on coordinated operation of the federal and state water
projects, thus increasing efficient water uses and creating a model of
cooperation that other states may wish to follow.
This is not to suggest that all federal-state conflicts have ended
and that no differences remain. To the contrary, much has yet to be
decided. The courts have yet to fully clarify the kind of congressional
"directives" that will be held to preempt state laws under the
California decision. For instance, the states' authority to require
federal projects to allocate water for purposes not envisioned by
Congress has not been fully defined, particularly where the exercise
of state authority may affect the relative costs and benefits of the
project as understood by Congress. Although future disputes may
remain, however, it is increasingly clear that the era of conflict that
104. 100 Stat. 3050 (1986).
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dominated much of the early federal reclamation program ha9 given
way to a new era of 6ooperation, one in which federal and state
agencies focus more on areas of agreement rather than disagreement.
That, perhapsi is the greatest legacy of the Supreme Court's juris-
prudence.
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